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ABSTRACT 
CANTWELL, ANN E. “Divorce Devastates: Does No-Fault State Divorce Law Heave an Effect 
on Women’s Economic Well-being?” Department of Economics, June 2015. 
ADVISOR: Younghwan Song 
Divorce devastates a family, and with over 40% of first marriages ending in divorce in 
the United States, it is important to analyze the effect divorce has on each member of the family.  
This paper aims specifically at the economic effect of divorce on women, and furthermore, if the 
implementation of a no-fault divorce clause in state law has negatively impacted women’s well-
being.   Women’s well-being is determined by annual income divided by annual need.  
 The study looks at three different state divorce laws surrounding fault—fault-based, no-
fault as the only option, and no-fault as grounds for divorce—as well as variance due to age, 
education, number of children, and race.  The data is compiled from the Panel Study on Income 
Dynamics, which allows observations ranging from 1968-2011 of over 5,000 families in the 
United States.  Panel data allows this study to trace a family’s well-being over time.  Further 
research at the website of the American Bar Association was needed to find each state’s divorce 
law and the date of any changes surrounding fault.  
This paper finds that a no-fault divorce law has a significant effect on women’s well-
being, as women under such a state divorce law face a decline in well-being greater than that of a 
fault divorce law.  It appears that women under a fault divorce law are more likely to receive a 
larger portion of assets in the form of child support and alimony than women under a no-fault 
divorce law; these additional assets allow for a woman’s well-being to be considerably higher 
under a fault divorce scheme. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Although marriage trends have shifted in the United States, with more marriages 
beginning later in an individual’s life, divorce rates are still dramatically high.  It is commonly 
noted that almost half of marriages end in a divorce (Kennedy and Ruggles, 2014).  With divorce 
affecting so many Americans, it is crucial to analyze the impact of such a tragedy.  Individuals 
are undoubtedly affected emotionally, but the focus of this paper is the economic effect of 
divorce.  
Economists have revealed that there are economic benefits of marriage due to economies 
of scale: a married couple paying for a home is less expensive per person than if a single man 
was paying for the same home by himself.  An additional person in a home does not double the 
cost per person.  It is not plausible to say that the economic benefits are the cause of marriage, 
but there are noticeable advantages.  Now, one might wonder if the opposite is true?  If a couple 
gets a divorce what is the economic effect?  Do both man and woman experience the same 
financial burden of a divorce, or is the burden felt more so on one individual? 
Unfortunately for women, the economic burden of divorce, on average, is felt more so by 
women than men, with divorced women seeing a decline in their standard of living by 6.7 
percent whereas men see it rise by 16.5 percent (Espenshade, 1979)  
There have not been many economists to research the economic effect divorce has on 
women within the last thirty years, so updating the data and then analyzing it with a law-based 
lens will provide great insight for economists and lawyers alike.   What can law-makers do to 
minimize such economic burdens? Are these burdens felt nationally?  Is there a longitudinal 
shift?  Has the economic welfare of a woman post-divorce shifted over time?  Does a second 
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divorce have the same economic effect as a first divorce?  Previous studies have conclusively 
seen that women, post-divorce are fiscally worse off.  
Prior to the 1960s the United States viewed divorce as a fault-based system, where one 
partner must be to blame for a dissolving marriage.  Aspects of fault include adultery, abuse, and 
imprisonment.  Under the California Family Law Act of 1969, the state did not need to find fault 
in one party to grant a divorce.  The state of California believed that it was not the role of 
government to impede on an individual’s desire to divorce (Wardle, 1991).  With California’s 
new no-fault divorce, other states throughout the United States decided to follow suit and 
abandon traditional fault divorce laws.  There were states that decided not to radically change 
their divorce laws, and as a compromise, they implemented no-fault as grounds for divorce.  This 
distinction is critical: to add fault to grounds for divorce means that there is still an option to 
pursue a fault-based divorce, and often only available after a given amount of separation, 
whereas no-fault divorce law does not require any explanation to the courts.   Aware of the fact 
that women suffer more from divorce in the traditional sense, it is necessary to examine if the 
change in state divorce law practices have an additional effect on women’s well-being.   
The economic welfare of the family is defined by the family’s income divided by its 
need.  A divorce will cause the income and needs to be altered; for example, if the woman gains 
full custody of the children, which is often the case, the woman’s income will now include 
alimony and child support and the needs of the children, whereas the male’s income will 
decrease due to the previously mentioned payments and his needs will also greatly decrease. The 
econometric model of this study focuses on the economic well-being of the family and its 
relationship with the employment status of the parents, its residential state, state divorce law, 
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marriage status, number of children, educational level of parents, length of marriage, religion, 
and race. 
This study attempts to build off of the previous research completed by Wardle (1991), 
Singer (1993), and Gray (1998) by updating the national data and ultimately find a statistical 
connection between state divorce law regulations and women’s well-being.  This paper will first 
examine the scholarly conversation surrounding divorce and women’s well-being, followed by 
the scholarly conversation surrounding the implementation of no-fault divorce and its effect on 
women’s well-being.  The next section of this paper reveals the econometric model and a 
description of the variables used in the model.  The paper then explains the sample selection 
process, an explanation of the statistics presented in the tables, and finally concludes with a 
summary of the findings, policy implications, limitations, and suggestions for future research.  
 
4 
CHAPTER TWO 
EXISTING LITERATURE 
 This chapter examines existing literature surrounding the topic of the economic effect of 
divorce on women and the effect of no-fault divorce laws.  Multiple authors have commented on 
this topic and the following chapter includes their findings.   
 
A. The Effect of Divorce on Women 
Espenshade (1979) reveals that in 1960 there were 4.51 million female-headed families and 
just eighteen years later, in 1978, there were 8.24 million female-headed families.  This trend is 
believed to result from an increase in divorce rates that simultaneously took place during this 
time period.  With the rise of female-headed families, it is necessary to examine how they fare 
economically.  Espenshade illuminates that female-headed families are at a high risk or 
becoming poor.  He refers to the statistic that divorced women see a decline in their standard of 
living by 6.7 percent whereas men see a rise in 16.5 percent. 
Espenshade (1979) highlights the shortcomings of child support.  Women often receive 
full custody of the children after a divorce disrupts a family, but the amount the court determines 
acceptable to care for the children is typically not enough.  Furthermore, Espenshade reminds his 
audience of a practical matter associated with child support: often the full amount is not received.  
The lack of income for the head of household causes a decline in the well-being, as well-being is 
defined by (income/family needs).  McLindon (1987) also highlights a reason for the steep 
decline in women’s well-being post-divorce to be a lack of adequate child support received.  
McLindon uses Sweden as an example of a potential reform: Sweden mandates that all child 
support be paid by the government with the responsible spouse then indebted to the government, 
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thus eliminating the risk of unpaid support parents with custody in the United States face.  The 
Swedish government takes all of the risk away from the custodial parent.  If the noncustodial 
parent does not pay, he or she faces federal offenses.  Unfortunately, the lack of child support is 
not the only problem associated with the decline in economic well-being a female faces post-
divorce.  
Duncan and Hoffman (1985) published one of the most read and respected study on the 
economic effect of divorce using PSID data, which acts as a guide for this research.  Their 
analysis includes data from 1969-1975.  The findings of Duncan and Hoffman reveal that a white 
woman sees an 11% decline in well-being a year after divorce and a black woman sees a 29% 
decline in well-being the first year after a divorce.  Simultaneously, Duncan and Hoffman see a 
rise in men’s well-being one year after a divorce.   
A lack of a balance between assets is justifiable if the alimony is therefore comparable, 
but as McLindon, and Espenshade have pointed out this is not the case.  Women, on average, 
receive less, causing their economic welfare to diminish.  Espenshade and Duncan and Hoffman 
illuminate that frequently the level of income post-divorce is so low some women are not able to 
meet the family needs and are forced to receive government assistance. 
 
B. No-Fault Divorce and Women’s Well-Being 
Weitzman (1985) distinguishes her research from similar research by focusing on the 
effect divorce had on women economically in a no-fault divorce society.  California was the first 
state in the United States to enact a no-fault divorce law under its California Family Law Act of 
1969.  No-fault divorce came into effect in California according to Wardle (1991) as an attempt 
to minimize the public’s animosity towards divorce court.  People began pointing out that the 
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state’s desire to pry into someone’s private life to find fault in their marriage caused more 
problems than necessary.  In an attempt to find fault, lawyers were encouraging their clients to 
file unjust claims, causing people to lie under oath just to receive a divorce.  The public 
consensus was that receiving a divorce should not be as difficult as fault divorce deemed 
appropriate.  In order to make the public happy and maintain legal credibility the state of 
California, California in 1969 amended its divorce law to allow no-fault divorce on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences.  The notion of no-fault divorce spread throughout the nation, and 
by 1989 forty-nine states and Washington, D.C. implemented some form of the no-fault divorce 
reform.  There was not a uniformed provision, although organizations like the American Bar 
Association attempted to create such reform, believing that it was important for states to agree on 
a divorce regulation.  Some states implemented clauses such as a separation period before a no-
fault divorce can be filed, while others left its citizens with only one option: no-fault.  The 
differences between state divorce laws make it difficult to find the economic effect of divorce on 
women in the United States because it might vary by state. 
Weitzman’s findings reveal that, as an effect of California’s no-fault divorce law, 
women’s economic well-being decreases by 73 percent post-divorce whereas men’s well-being 
increases by 42 percent post-divorce.  These figures are shocking and caused much controversy 
within the United States, as many states implemented similar policies without considering how 
women and children would be financially affected.   
 
C. Errors within Weitzman’s Study 
It is important to note that researchers found numerous faults with Weitzman’s report. 1 
Therefore any conclusions Weitzman drew should not be determined factual.  Weitzman’s 
sample was too small.  Her study was focused on the state of California, but she only examined 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Peterson (1996) and Hoffman and Duncan (1988) 
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divorced individuals from Los Angeles, which is not necessarily representative of the whole state 
(Peterson, 1996).  There are regional differences, even within a state, that have an impact on 
financial well-being; for example, the differences between cost of living within an urban area 
and a rural area.  To draw a conclusion on the state of California using only an urban sample 
creates an unrealistic description of the state as a whole.  Furthermore, because her sample was 
too specific, and therefore biased, she did not receive a plethora of participants from each income 
class.  She admits that the financial elite responded to her survey request in much higher volumes 
than the other economic classes (Weitzman, 1985).  To not have a reasonably well distributed 
participants from each economic class, leaves the data following the trend of the elite and losing 
the significance of any variance amongst the middle and lower class citizens.  Another issue with 
her sample was the high magnitude of long-married couples versus short-married couples 
(Peterson, 1996).  Long-married couples naturally acquire more assets, and therefore, a long-
married couple feels the economic effect of divorce more so than a short-married couple who 
does not lose much during a divorce because they have not gained very much throughout the 
marriage.  It is not accurate to have a study with a lop-sided representation of the public 
population. 
Hoffman and Duncan (1988) reveal the discrepancies within Weitzman’s (1985) findings; 
it is essential to properly define and calculate variables throughout the study.  One issue noted is 
the difference between the amount of child support deemed appropriate by the court and the 
amount of child support the spouse received.  The amount paid is the more accurate indicator of 
the true economic position the husband and wife are in post-divorce.  Furthermore, post-divorce, 
it is likely that the family size will alter due to a cohabiter or even a new spouse—such changes 
must be represented in both the income and the need.  Duncan and Hoffman’s evaluation of 
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Weitzman’s data reveals that she added the new members of the household to the need side of 
the equation, but eliminated them to the added income, which leads to an unrealistic value of the 
family welfare.  Peterson (1996) also reveals the general errors within Weitzman’s data; she used 
graduate students to conduct the interviews and the paper documents of those interviews do not 
align with the computer file created to express the data.  When he recreated a computer file from 
the original interviews, Peterson explains that there was at least one error in 27 of Weitzman’s 
228 observations.  Peterson also notes that income data was missing for 66 men and 67 women 
within Weitzman’s data.  Weitzman’s data was drawn based on phone conversations, and often 
only one spouse was interviewed.  Men cannot accurately describe their ex-wives’ income, 
neither can women accurately describe their ex-husbands’ income.  Hoffman and Duncan (1988) 
and Peterson (1996) illuminate the numerous flaws of Weitzman’s data set. The average decline 
in well-being post-divorce for female-headed families according to Hoffman and Duncan (1988) 
is 33 percent, which is much smaller than Weitzman’s 73percent decline. 
 
D. Nationally No-Fault Divorce Law Leads to a Decline in Women’s Well-Being 
Smock, Manning, and Gupta (1996) categorize the data by region and find that divorced 
women living in the south have worse economic well-being than women living in other parts of 
the United States.  Does the south have a divorce law that places women in a relatively worse 
state than women elsewhere in the country?  Questions like these encourage researchers to not 
only look at the economic effect of divorce on women, but also to see if there are certain state 
divorce laws that have an effect on the financial livelihood of a woman after a divorce. 
Wardle (1991) reveals that in California, the first society to implement a no-fault divorce 
law, women received less alimony, child support, and portion of family assets, while 
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simultaneously receiving a higher relative share of the couple’s debt than when the state acted 
under a fault based divorce system. 
Commonly women chose, in a marriage, to focus their efforts on home production and 
allow the husband to work in the labor field.  At the moment of a divorce, women lose the 
income of their previous husbands and some are required to enter the labor market.  After being 
out of the labor force for years, it is very difficult to receive a suitable job.  Experience affects 
wage, and therefore, if a woman does not have experience in the field, she is likely to receive a 
lower wage.  Women already face a wage gap due to their sex, but the lack of experience only 
further inhibits their income.  Singer (1993) believes that men and women contribute equally to 
the family’s success, and therefore at the time of a divorce each spouse should receive an equal 
division of income and assets.  Singer sees the validity in the economic advantages of marriage 
and thinks the economic burden of a divorce should be equally shared. 
Wardle (1991), Singer (1993), and Gray (1998) emphasize the lack of equitable division 
of marital assets under a no-fault divorce system.  Gray states that under a common-law 
jurisdiction the men often receive the assets in the event of a divorce.  Some states, according to 
Gray, in an attempt to minimize the gap between the economic well-being of men and women 
post-divorce are considering implementing community-property laws.  Community-property 
jurisdictions under the no-fault divorce law tend to give the wife more of the family assets.  
Unfortunately no one knows the future economic effect of such a policy, although it appears it 
would help more accurately divide the economic burden of divorce.  The effects in California 
have been felt nationally according to McLindon (1987), as he sees women receiving less 
alimony in no-fault divorces and believes it is necessary to re-evaluate fault to some level to 
more accurately divide the financial burden of divorce.  The intentions of no-fault divorce law 
10 
seemed justifiable, but legislators did not perceive the economic effect such regulation would 
have on women. 
 
E. The Opposing View: No-Fault Divorce Does Not Decrease Women’s Well-Being 
Although a majority of the research shows that there is a negative impact on women’s 
well-being due to the implementation of no-fault divorce, Weiss and Willis (1993) reveal just the 
opposite effect.  Their research yields a large, positive effect associated with no-fault divorce and 
women’s well-being, although the coefficients are not significant.  This is the first mention of a 
disagreement on the effect of no-fault divorce law on women’s well-being and is cause for 
speculation.  Weiss and Willis agree that women suffer more so than men economically after a 
divorce, but they do not believe that there is any direct link with divorce laws.  They believe that 
women post-divorce due to the no-fault laws gain from an increase in monetary transfers and 
favorable division of marital property.  Jacob (1989) concludes that a woman’s income is very 
weakly affected by no-fault divorce laws.  Gray (1998) and Espenshade (1979) make it very 
clear that it is the well-being of a woman that is affected the most by divorce as she receives less 
assets, alimony, and child support than needed to cover her expenses.  Jacob focuses his 
argument on income, which is just a piece of economic well-being.  Furthermore, Sweezy and 
Tiefenthaler (1996) use Jacob’s findings to explain that the economic effect of divorce on 
women does not correlate with no-fault divorce law but rather other state characteristics such as 
religious tendencies.  Sweezy and Tiefenthaler believe that a woman’s economic fall correlates 
with her society’s morals.  Although I believe a variable like religion might have an effect on a 
woman’s well-being, I do not think that it is a variable that can significantly explain the decline 
in all women’s well-being.  Furthermore, using the fixed-effect model individual aspects, like 
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religious tendencies, are taken into consideration.  Therefore this paper does not include the 
findings of Sweezy and Tiefenthaler.   
 
F. Purpose of Paper 
Effects of a policy change are not always felt immediately.  Most of the research done 
involving state divorce laws affecting the economic effect of divorce on women was done in the 
late eighties/early nineties, and there does not seem to be a definitive answer.  Updating the data 
using the PSID from 1968-2011 allows for more divorce cases in the United States to be 
included in the study.  Furthermore, the state divorce laws have varied over the years ranging 
from fault divorce to unilateral no-fault divorce law; each variation could affect women’s 
welfare differently.  With a large data pool it is possible to test state law differences that 
economically affect divorced women.  Using the available literature, this paper intends to assess 
the fiscal impact of state legislation on women’s well-being post-divorce.
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CHAPTER THREE 
ESTIMATING THE EFFECT OF NO-FAULT DIVORCE  
ON WOMEN’S WELL-BEING 
 This chapter examines the econometric model of this paper, an explanation of the 
variables chosen, and the models used to express the data. 
 
A. Econometric Model 
Model: 
WELL-BEINGit = β0i + β1 NO-FAULT×DIVORCEDit + β2 NO-FAULT2×DIVORCEDit +  
β3 DIVORCEDit + β4 NO-FAULTit +β5 NO-FAULT2it + β6 EDUCATIONit +β7 AGEit +  
β8 BLACKi + β9 HISPANICi + β10 OTHER_RACEi +β11 CHILDRENit +β11 STATEit + 
β12 YEARit + γi + εit 
 
Dependent Variable 
• WELL-BEING which is defined as INCOME/NEED 
o INCOME is total annual income 
o NEED is determined by an annual poverty threshold set by U.S. Census Bureau 
 
Independent Variables 
• NO-FAULT×DIVORCED An interaction term between no-fault and divorced women 
• NO-FAULT2×DIVORCED An interaction term between no-fault as grounds for 
divorce and divorced women 
• DIVORCED*   Dummy variable that indicates the woman is divorced 
• NO-FAULT**  Dummy variable to reveal no-fault is the only divorce law 
• NO-FAULT2**  Dummy variable that indicates no-fault was added as a 
      grounds for fault-based state divorce law 
• EDUCATION   Years of education completed  
• BLACK***   Dummy variable to distinguish Black women 
• HISPANIC***  Dummy variable to distinguish Hispanic women 
• OTHER_RACE***  Dummy variable to encompass all other racial categories 
• CHILDREN    Number of children in family unit  
• STATE    Dummy variable, which is defined by state of residence 
• YEAR    Year of the observation 
• γ    Unobserved variable (Individual Fixed-effect) 
• ε    Error term  
 
*The reference group is married women. 
**The reference group is fault-based divorce law. 
***The reference group is non-Hispanic White. 
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B. Variable Explanation 
The economic WELL-BEING is the dependent variable of the study and defined by the 
annual income divided by the U.S. Census Bureau’s national need standard, calculated yearly.  
WELL-BEING is therefore a ratio, which will be calculated annually per household and can be 
compared pre-divorce and post-divorce for each individual household, as well as compared to 
other households in the same state, enduring the same divorce law regulations.   
The most influential independent variables are the dummy variables surrounding divorce 
law’s, NO-FAULT, NO-FAULT2, and its reference group of fault-based divorce.  These three 
categories encompass the different national divorce laws present in each state.  To test the 
significance these divorce laws have on the well-being of women post-divorce is the sole 
purpose behind this study.  The state divorce law variables must interact with the marital status 
dummy variable, DIVORCED, in order to see the true effect of the law on divorced women.  It is 
important to note that the variable DIVORCED includes women separated, and for the purpose 
of this paper every time the variable is mentioned it refers to women separated and/or divorced.  
The interaction terms between the state divorce law and whether or not the women were 
divorced shows the effect of the specified divorce law on a divorced woman’s well-being; 
whereas the individual terms reveal just the effect of the state’s divorce law on the woman’s 
well-being and the effect of a divorce on the woman’s well-being.  It is inferred that the 
interaction between NO-FAULT and DIVORCED will have the greatest impact on the well-
being of divorced women, as this divorce law is believed to leave women with less alimony and 
child support, and more financial liabilities than the other forms of divorce-law.  The reference 
group, fault-based divorce, is believed to more generously side with the woman, and therefore 
leave her in a better, although not great, financial position than the other divorce laws.  
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The independent variable EDUCATION is used to test the effect of a woman’s ability to 
earn income.  It is a common trend that the higher level of education a woman has, the better 
career, wage, and salary she will receive.  With this notion in mind, it is therefore necessary to 
test the relationship EDUCATION has on a woman’s well-being.  Some women post-divorce are 
financially stable because of their high degrees and steady employment, whereas some women 
have not been in the labor force for years and are consequently at a disadvantage economically.  
Similarly, it is important to test whether or not aspects of the marriage have an effect on the 
woman’s well-being post-divorce; therefore the variable CHILDREN is included in the model.  
Critics note that the more children the family has the more likely it is for the woman to fair better 
economically during the divorce.  The woman is likely to receive majority of custody of the 
children, causing the ex-husband to pay child support; the more children the family has, the more 
child support the woman is awarded.  Child support is an aspect of a divorced woman’s income 
when she is the head of the household.  Another aspect of income, alimony, also increases when 
the number of children increases.   
Regional differences, which this study covers with the independent dummy variables for 
the state the family resides in, are believed to have an impact on a divorced woman’s well-being 
due to societal tendencies.  For example, southern women fare the worst post-divorce because of 
stricter societal expectations of a woman’s role to maintain a marriage (Sweezy and Tiefenthaler 
1996). 
 Another independent variable the study examines is race.  It is possible that a woman’s 
welfare is impacted by her race.  It is expected that each race fares differently post-divorce, and 
therefore the race of the woman should be analyzed against her well-being.  Year is also an 
independent variable, to track the time of a divorce and the state divorce law present that year.  
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The final independent added to the econometric model is individual fixed effects, which 
encompasses any individual time-invariant unmeasurable characteristics that a woman might 
have that has an impact on her economic well-being.   
 
C. Estimation Methods 
 This paper uses the ordinary least squares (OLS) method and the fixed effect model to 
interpret the effect of no-fault divorce on women’s well-being.  Incorporating the fixed effect 
model was crucial to account for unobserved individual factors that could affect an individual’s 
well-being.  An example of a factor corrected for using the fixed effect model is a woman’s drug 
abuse: if a woman has a history of drug abuse and is still using harmful drugs, it is likely that her 
well-being will be low during her marriage and after her divorce.  With this specific case the 
drug abuse would be a fixed effect on her well-being.  There are also fixed effects that place an 
individual at a higher level of well-being that will be accounted for using the fixed effect model.   
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CHAPTER FOUR  
SELECTING THE SAMPLE FROM THE PANEL STUDY OF INCOME DYNAMICS 
This chapter reveals the characteristics of the data set including why observations were 
included and excluded from the study, and a brief overview of statistics present in the regression 
tables. 
 
A. Overview of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
This study utilizes the data available from University of Michigan’s compilation referred 
to as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID data contains very specific 
information on 5,000 families in the United States from 1968-2011.  PSID is a reliable database 
that many economists studying the economic effect of divorce on women used during their 
research, such as Espenshade (1979), Duncan and Hoffman (1985), Hoffman and Duncan 
(1988), Weiss (1984) and Gray (1998).  To determine the economic effect, there must be data 
prior to the divorce and for the years after the divorce.  PSID is superior to any other study 
because of its continuous data on a random sample of American families from repeated surveys.  
PSID follows the offspring of the original 1968 sample.  With forty-three years of data and a 
large sample size, PSID incorporates a multitude of observations, which allows specific research 
to be conducted.   
All of the variables in the econometric model of this study were compiled from PSID, 
with the exception of the divorce law data, which was found using the American Bar 
Association’s publication.  The American Bar Association’s data contained numerous clauses for 
each divorce law, so it was necessary to simplify the data.  Using fault, no-fault, and fault as 
grounds, it was possible to remove the presence of stipulations, such as, in order for a couple to 
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file for divorce with grounds of no-fault, the couple must be separated for six months.2  Minor 
details that vary by each state are deemed too tedious for this study.  Table 1 shows each state’s 
divorce law and the date it was implemented.   
The full PSID survey contains over 18,000 individuals, and this study analyzes 60,987 
observations from 5,772 individuals of which 1,048 individuals are divorced. People were 
eliminated from the study due to primarily sex and marital status, as men and singles were not 
needed for this study.  There are two types of women observed: women that were married 
throughout the length of the study and women who were married and then faced a divorce or 
separation throughout the study.  Women who were remarried and or women who moved to a 
different state after their divorce were not included in this study.  The survey was conducted 
annually from 1968-1997 and then biannually from 1999-2011, with participants from around 
the United States. 
 
B. Selection of the Sample  
Unfortunately there are errors within the data set that cannot be explained, which lead to 
the removal of participants within the study.  For example, there were 68 individuals who PSID 
classified as a male but also as the wife; our study just focuses on females who are either the 
head-of-the-household or the wife.  These few observations could not be explained and were 
therefore removed.  Regarding the race of the individuals, from 1993 to 2011 the conductors of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 I classified the states that had no-fault as grounds for divorce based off of the length of separation required prior to 
filing a no-fault divorce—less than one year, from one to two years, and more than three years—regressions.  I ran 
regressions with these additions, but those coefficients turned out to be insignificant; therefore it was determined to 
remove the stipulation and keep the grouped variable of NO-FAULT2 as representative of all states that have an 
option of filing for a no-fault divorce as grounds for a divorce.  
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the survey recorded the first mentioned race, which allowed for variance within an individual’s 
race record. 3  All individuals with varying race responses were eliminated from the study.   
Beginning in 1997 the survey is only administered every two years, which allows for 
some discrepancy within when major changes took place.  Furthermore, the survey accounts for 
changes within the year but does not ask for specific dates.  In order to code the data from the 
American Bar Association regarding the change in state divorce laws, a distinction needed to be 
made.  For every change in divorce law from the beginning of May through the end of December 
of each year it was coded as happening in the next year.  For every change in divorce law from 
January through the end of April it was coded as taking place in that specified year.  Finally, 
participants remained within the study if they were from 25-55 years of age, aware that changes 
in employment before and after this range can have a large impact on well-being.  Acquiring a 
job, in this study presumably before the age of twenty-five, would greatly increase a woman’s 
well-being as well as retiring, in this study estimated after the age of fifty-five years old, would 
greatly decrease a woman’s well-being (Duncan and Hoffman 1985).  
 
C. Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the women observed in this study.  The first 
set of numbers correlate to the full sample, whereas the second only observes the first two years 
after the divorce, and the third incorporates the first five years after the divorce.  There were 
multiple samples within this study to eliminate issues associated with the forty-four year time 
span.  The first two years examined after the separation or divorce was too short and the results 
were not significant, so the time frame was expanded to the first five years after a separation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Interracial marriages were not common in the United States before 1985, although this does not mean that they 
were not present.  There was also an issue with race: prior to 1985 the PSID survey did not include the wife’s race 
because it was assumed that the race of the head was the race of the wife. 
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Weiss (1984) inspired the addition of a restricted time frame.  This regression, the first five years 
after separation, is the best time frame to examine the effect of no-fault divorce on the economic 
well-being of women.  The average participant age is just over thirty-nine years old, with 63.4% 
of the sample being White, 28.3% being Black, 6.4% being Hispanic and 1.9% categorized as 
other.  The average number of children is 1.6, and the average well-being of the woman is 3.989.  
The average number of years of education for the women in the sample is just over twelve, 
referring to the traditional length of a high school diploma.  The statistics vary little from the full 
sample to the other limited samples. 
 Table 3 is the regression table for all of the women within the study.  The dependent 
variable in Table 3, as it is in all regressions in this study, is well-being.  The full sample 
regression takes into consideration the Ordinary Least Squares model (1) and OLS with the 
individual Fixed-Effects (2).  The fixed-effect model takes into consideration potential 
unobserved or constant factors that would have an effect on a woman’s well-being, and therefore 
was needed in this study to incorporate individual characteristics of participants that impact her 
well-being.  Examples of individual factors covered by the fixed-effect model include addictions, 
morals and belief systems.  Race is removed from a fixed-effect model because it does not 
change over time.  In Table 3 the data reveals that a woman under a no-fault scheme, holding all 
other variables constant, faces a decline in her well-being by 0.43, whereas a woman under a no-
fault as grounds for divorce or in this study labeled as no-fault2, holding all other variables 
constant, faces a decline in her well-being by 0.28.  This distinction supports the hypothesis that 
women under a strict no-fault state divorce law see a larger decline in well-being than women 
under a fault-based divorce system.  Although no-fault2 does allow for no-fault divorce, it is not 
the only option: women under no-fault2 are able to argue their stance within the marriage and the 
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divorce, often placing blame on the men, and allowing women to receive more of the marital 
assets than under a no-fault divorce law.  The reference group for no-fault and no-fault2 is fault, 
in which a state requires fault to be placed on one party for the dissolution of the marriage.  
Impacts such as a decline in a woman’s well-being while there is a rise in number of children are 
to be expected due to the expenses associated with children.  Furthermore, the idea that an 
increase in a woman’s age will lead to a rise in her well-being also can be expected, as the older 
a person becomes the more financial stability he or she is expected to have.  The Fixed-Effect 
model (2) within this table reveals similar data, but places less importance on the effect of 
education than the OLS model (1) does: for every additional year of education a woman’s well-
being only increases by 0.17 in the OLS model that includes fixed effects and 0.54 in the OLS 
model that does not include fixed effects.  The other striking difference between the two models 
shown in Table 3 is the effect of a divorced woman under the no-fault as being grounds for 
divorce state regulation, as it, holding all other things constant, diminished a woman’s well-being 
by 0.40, which is much higher than the OLS model statistic of 0.28.  The full sample regression 
includes a varying amount of time for each divorced woman, which could have an effect on a 
woman’s well-being.  For example, a woman divorced in 1972 remains in the sample until she 
reaches the age of 55 which could be thirty years or it could be three years.  Furthermore, a long 
period after divorce loses the effect of the divorce and the state’s divorce law.  Setting a time 
restriction to the sample will make the results more dependable.  
   Table 4 presents the regression table for women who have been divorced or separated 
for up to two years.4  The effect of education, children, and race in Table 4 is comparable to that 
of Table 3.  It is revealed once again that a woman’s well-being declines by 1.55 when she is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The table contains up to two years because the PSID survey was only conducted every other year beginning in 
1997.  To unify the regression the time period must contain up to two years because one year after the divorce is not 
available for observations between 1997-2011. 
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divorced or separated, holding all other variables constant, but what is interesting about this 
regression table is the lack of significance present with a woman who is divorced under a no-
fault2 scheme—where no-fault is grounds for divorce within the state she resides in.  In a state 
that holds a NO-FAULT2 divorce law, the average woman’s well-being is seen to have declined 
by miniscule amounts under both OLS and Fixed-Effect models 0.04 and 0.05 respectively.  On 
the contrary, Table 4 shows that under a no-fault scheme a divorced woman faces a 0.40 decline 
in well-being.  The one common distinction between this regression and the others is the fact that 
it contains the lowest value of loss of well-being under the no-fault state divorce law and under 
the no-fault2 divorce law, revealing that the time period of only two years may not account for 
the whole effect of divorce, as divorce’s effect is not, on average, felt immediately.  Because 
some of the coefficients are not significant in Table 4, the time elapsed since the divorce or 
separation is expanded in Table 5. 
 Table 5 presents the regression table for women who have been divorced or separated for 
up to five years.  Again the data does not show a significant relationship between the well-being 
of a divorced or separated woman under the no-fault2 state divorce laws.  A woman’s well-being 
does appear to decline when she is divorced or separated, in this regression by 1.81 under the 
OLS model and 1.70 under the Fixed-Effect model, but the no-fault2 aspect does not have a 
significant effect.  The no-fault as the only divorce law does have a significant effect, as a 
woman, holding all other variables constant, that is divorced or separated in a state that abides by 
a no-fault divorce law sees a decline in her well-being by 0.43 under the OLS model and 0.42 
under the Fixed-Effect model.   
 Adding a time limitation was deemed necessary, as Sterling (1989) raised the idea that 
errors in Weitzman (1985) did not account for aspects that could improve a woman’s well-being, 
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such as remarriage.  Many women, facing the financial burden of being divorced, seek a new 
relationship that can provide them with the financial luxuries of economies of scale.   This study 
does not examine any women that were remarried.  Table 3, which contains the full sample, 
without restricting the observations due to the amount of time that elapsed since the divorce, has 
the most coefficients that are deemed significant.  Therefore, it is apparent that significant 
interpretations of the effect of the no-fault divorce law need to include sufficient time post-
divorce for the economic effect to be felt. 
 These statistical findings reveal that a woman’s well-being relative to women facing fault 
divorce significantly declines.  Women are not susceptible to the same judicial treatment during 
a divorce under the two schemes.  It is more beneficial for a woman seeking a divorce to live in a 
state that complies with a fault divorce law.   
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CONCLUSION 
 
A. Summary of the Findings 
Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968-2011, this study 
investigates the effect state divorce laws surrounding fault have on the well-being of divorced 
women.  In contrast to previous studies in the field, this study contains observations from many 
years, which allows the true effect of no-fault divorce laws to be visible.   
This study finds that women that underwent a no-fault divorce saw, on average, holding all 
other factors constant, a decline in well-being of 0.42 relative to women who filed for divorce 
under a fault divorce scheme.  This value was found under a fixed-effect model that specifically 
looked at women that were divorced or separated for up to five years.  Women who face a 
divorce in a state where no-fault is considered as grounds for divorce but is not the only means 
for filing a divorce also face, on average holding all other factors constant, a decline in well-
being of 0.24 relative to women who are divorced under a fault regime; this figure is not deemed 
statistically significant within the five year designated period.  Women faced with a no-fault 
divorce due to state regulations fare considerably worse than women under a fault based divorce 
system.    
 
B. Policy Implications 
The results of this study can be used by policy makers as they analyze the effectiveness of 
state divorce laws.  As many have pointed out, the fault divorce law caused the legal system to 
lose its validity, and a change needed to be made, but allowing individuals to become divorced 
without placing blame on one party allows for the division of assets and debt to be less than they 
otherwise would be, which further diminishes women’s well-being.  Divorce is a sensitive 
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subject, but the United States court system needs to reanalyze the divisions of assets and 
liabilities in order to protect women from such a large decline in well-being relative to others.  
None of the divorce schemes are perfect; in order to improve the effect of fault and no-fault 
divorce laws, the standards for the division of assets needs to be re-evaluated.  Divorce lawyers 
need to educate themselves in the grave position a woman under a no-fault divorce law faces and 
fight harder for more for their female clients, and judges, aware of the position women face post-
divorce, need to be more generous in their final rulings when it comes to alimony and child 
support payments. 
 
C. Limitations of this Study 
Within the study, a woman who moved to a new state could not be accounted for as the effect 
of their well-being could not be separated from the new state of residency and the state divorce 
law that she faced in her original state.  Finally, this study only analyzes fault aspects of divorce 
law; there are many other aspects of divorce law that could be examined in order to narrow in on 
what else is causing women’s well-being to diminish. 
 
D. Suggestions for Future Research 
In a progression of this study, researches should categorize additional aspects of state divorce 
law such as unilateral divorce and equitable division of assets to see what combination of state 
divorce laws result in the best well-being of divorced men and women.  Such data could give 
policy makers a clear direction of where state divorce laws need to go in order to protect the 
men, women and children of the United States who are affected by divorce. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Effective Date and Type of Divorce Laws Present in Each State  
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
No- Fault Divorce  No-Fault as Grounds for Divorce 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
Alabama 
 
10/1/1971 
Alaska 
 
1/1/1963 
Arizona 5/14/1973 
 Arkansas 
 
1991 
California Jan-70 1963 
Colorado Jan-72 
 Connecticut 
 
May-73 
Delaware 1968 
 Florida Jul-71 
 Georgia 
 
Apr-73 
Hawaii Apr-72 
 Idaho 
 
Feb-71 
Illinois 
 
1984 
Indiana 
 
Sep-73 
Iowa 3/20/1970 
 Kansas 
 
4/18/1969 
Kentucky Mar-72 
 Louisiana 
 
1979 
Maine Oct-73 
 Maryland 
 
1983 
Massachusetts 
 
12/30/1975 
Michigan Jan-72 
 Minnesota Mar-74 
 Mississippi 
 
May-76 
Missouri 
 
Jan-74 
Montana Mar-73 
 Nebraska Apr-72 
 Nevada 
 
1967 
New Hampshire 
 
1971 
New Jersey 
 
1971 
New Mexico 
 
Apr-73 
New York 
 
Sep-67 
North Carolina 
 
May-65 
North Dakota 
 
Mar-71 
Ohio 
 
1982 
Oklahoma 
 
May-53 
Oregon Oct-71 
 Pennsylvania 
 
1980 
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Rhode Island 
 
1975 
South Carolina 
 
Feb-79 
South Dakota 
 
1985 
Tennessee 
 
Apr-77 
Texas 
 
Jan-70 
Utah 
 
1987 
Vermont 
 
1972 
Virginia 
 
1975 
Washington Apr-73 
 West Virginia 
 
1977 
Wisconsin Feb-78 
 Wyoming 
 
May-77 
 
Source: 
“Family Law in 50 States: Grounds for Divorce and Residency Requirements.” Family Law 
Quarterly, Vol. 46 No. 4 (2013): 530-533. 
Vloskey, Denese Ashbaugh, Pamerla A. Monroe.  “The Effective Dates of No-Fault Divorce 
Laws in the 50 States.” National Council on Family Relations, Vol. 51 No. 4 (2002): 
317-324. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
                         (1)                     (2)                             (3)              
                    Full Sample              First 2 Years    First 5 Years 
      Divorced           Divorced              
 
  Mean      Standard  Mean    Standard  Mean      Standard 
                           Deviation       Deviation            Deviation 
 
Well-Being        3.989      (4.292)    4.090      (4.382)          4.158  (4.432) 
Divorced           0.127      (0.333)    0.068      (0.251)          0.035  (0.184) 
No-Fault           0.260      (0.439)    0.259      (0.438)          0.258  (0.438) 
No-Fault2         0.618      (0.486)    0.607      (0.488)          0.603  (0.489) 
Education      12.325      (2.657)  12.325      (2.683)        12.330  (2.689) 
Age          39.361      (8.720)  38.970      (8.724)        38.945  (8.768) 
White               0.634       (0.482)   0.650       (0.477)         0.658  (0.475) 
Black              0.283       (0.451)   0.269       (0.444)          0.263  (0.440) 
Hispanic          0.064       (0.246)   0.061       (0.240)          0.060  (0.238) 
Other Race       0.019       (0.135)   0.019       (0.137)          0.019  (0.137) 
Children           1.610       (1.550)   1.650       (1.560)          1.654  (1.560) 
 
 
N                     60,987                       57,109                       55,183             
Note: Within the PSID 5,772 women were selected of which 1,048 women were divorced within 
the sample period of 1968-2011.  Also individual weights were assigned in PSID. 
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Table 3. Regression Table of Full Sample 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 
   
No-Fault × Divorced -0.43*** -0.42*** 
 (0.112) (0.148) 
 
No-Fault2 × Divorced -0.28*** -0.40*** 
 (0.107) (0.127) 
   
Divorced -2.07*** -1.91*** 
 (0.109) (0.136) 
   
No-Fault -0.11 -0.28*** 
 (0.096) (0.083) 
   
No-Fault2 -0.50*** -0.26*** 
 (0.080) (0.072) 
   
Education 0.54*** 0.17*** 
 (0.014) (0.024) 
   
Age 0.11*** -0.09* 
 (0.032) (0.050) 
   
Black -1.06***  
 (0.040)  
   
Hispanic -0.45***  
 (0.115)  
   
Other Race -0.60***  
 (0.194)  
   
Children -0.61*** -0.56*** 
 (0.018) (0.026) 
   
Constant -4.64*** 3.34*** 
 (0.554) (1.139) 
   
Observations 60,987 60,987 
R-squared 0.177 0.532 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: State and Year are included in the model but not in the table. PSID assigned individual weights.  
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Table 4. Regression Sample of Women Divorced or Separated for 2 Years 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 
   
No-Fault × Divorced -0.40** -0.26 
 (0.190) (0.213) 
 
No-Fault2 × Divorced -0.04 -0.05 
 (0.183) (0.195) 
   
Divorced -1.55*** -1.46*** 
 (0.171) (0.177) 
   
No-Fault -0.13 -0.30*** 
 (0.100) (0.084) 
   
No-Fault2 -0.57*** -0.27*** 
 (0.087) (0.076) 
   
Education 0.55*** 0.17*** 
 (0.015) (0.027) 
   
Age 0.08** -0.13** 
 (0.036) (0.056) 
   
Black -1.14***  
 (0.046)  
   
Hispanic -0.48***  
 (0.132)  
   
Other Race -0.62***  
 (0.205)  
   
Children -0.62*** -0.58*** 
 (0.019) (0.030) 
   
Constant -4.29*** 4.11*** 
 (0.605) (1.258) 
   
Observations 55,183 55,183 
R-squared 0.168 0.529 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: State and Year are included in the model but not in the table. PSID assigned individual weights.
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Table 5. Regression Table of Women Divorced or Separated for up to 5 Years 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES OLS Fixed effect 
   
No-Fault × Divorced  -0.43*** -0.42** 
 (0.136) (0.176) 
 
No-Fault × Divorced -0.17 -0.24 
 (0.129) (0.154) 
   
Divorced -1.81*** -1.70*** 
 (0.123) (0.145) 
   
No-Fault -0.12 -0.29*** 
 (0.098) (0.084) 
   
No-Fault2 -0.53*** -0.26*** 
 (0.085) (0.074) 
   
Education 0.54*** 0.17*** 
 (0.015) (0.026) 
   
Age 0.08** -0.13** 
 (0.035) (0.054) 
   
Black -1.11***  
 (0.044)  
   
Hispanic -0.49***  
 (0.126)  
   
Other -0.63***  
 (0.200)  
   
Children -0.61*** -0.57*** 
 (0.019) (0.028) 
   
Constant -4.20*** 4.07*** 
 (0.593) (1.227) 
   
Observations 57,109 57,109 
R-squared 0.171 0.531 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: State and Year are included in the model but not in the table. PSID assigned individual weights. 
